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Abstract
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents,
although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders
either because their true orders are unknown to them or they are unwilling to completely
disclose the same. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents are allowed to submit
strict weak orders and we try to address the following questions from the perspective of a
market-designer: i) How can a designer generate matchings that are robust—in the sense
that they are “good” with respect to the underlying unknown true orders? ii) What is the
trade-off between the amount of missing information and the “quality” of solution one can
get? With the goal of resolving these questions through a simple and prior-free approach,
we suggest looking at matchings that minimize the maximum number of blocking pairs with
respect to all the possible underlying true orders as a measure of “goodness” or “quality”,
and subsequently provide results on finding such matchings.
In particular, we first restrict our attention to matchings that have to be stable with
respect to at least one of the completions (i.e., weakly-stable matchings) and show that in
this case arbitrarily filling-in the missing information and computing the resulting stable
matching can give a non-trivial approximation factor (i.e., o(n2)) for our problem in certain
cases. We complement this result by showing that, even under severe restrictions on the
preferences of the agents, the factor obtained is asymptotically tight in many cases. We
then investigate a special case, where only agents on one side provide strict weak orders and
all the missing information is at the bottom of their preference orders, and show that in
this special case the negative result mentioned above can be circumvented in order to get
a much better approximation factor; this result, too, is tight in many cases. Finally, we
move away from the restriction on weakly-stable matchings and show a general hardness of
approximation result and also discuss one possible approach that can lead us to a near-tight
approximation bound.
1 Introduction
Two-sided matching markets have numerous applications, e.g., in matching students to dormito-
ries (i.e., Stable Roommates problem (SR) [Irv85]), residents to hospitals (i.e., Hospital-Resident
problem (HR) [Man16]) etc., and hence are ubiquitous in practice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then,
this line of research has received much attention, with plenty of work done on investigating nu-
merous problems like SR and HR, and their many variations (we refer the reader to the excellent
books by Gusfield and Irving [GI89] and Manlove [Man13] for a survey on two-sided matching
problems). The focus of this paper, too, is on one such problem—one that is perhaps the most
widely-studied, but yet the simplest—called the Stable Marriage problem (SM), first introduced
by Gale and Shapley [GS62]. In SM we are given two disjoint sets (colloquially referred to as
the set of men and women) and each agent in one set specifies a strict linear order over the
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agents in the other set, and the aim is to find a stable matching, i.e., a matching where there is
no man-woman pair such that each of them prefers the other over their partner in the matching.
(Such a pair, if it exists, is called a blocking pair.)
While the assumption that the agents will be able to specify strict linear orders is not
unreasonable in small markets, in general, as the markets get larger, it may not be feasible
for an agent to determine a complete ordering over all the alternatives. Furthermore, there
may arise situations where agents are simply unwilling to provide strict total orders due to, say,
privacy concerns. Thus, it is natural for a designer to allow agents the flexibility to specify partial
orders, and so in this paper we assume that the agents submit strict weak orders1 (i.e, strict
partial orders where incomparability is transitive) that are consistent with their underlying true
strict linear orders. Although the issue of partially specified preferences has received attention
previously, we argue that certain aspects have not been addressed sufficiently. In particular,
the common approach to the question of what constitutes a “good” matching in such a setting
has been to either work with stable matchings that arise as a result of an arbitrary linear
extension of the submitted partial orders (these are known as weakly-stable matchings) or to
look at something known as super-stable matchings, which are matchings that are stable with
respect to all the possible linear extensions of the submitted partial orders [Irv94; Ras+14]. In
the case of the former, one key issue is that we often do not really know how “good” a particular
weakly-stable matching is with the respect to the underlying true orders of the agents, and in
the case of the latter they often do not exist. Furthermore, we believe that it is in the interest
of the market-designer to understand how robust or “good” a matching is with respect to the
underlying true orders of the agents, for, if otherwise, issues relating to instability and market
unravelling can arise since the matching that is output by a mechanism can be arbitrarily bad
with respect to these true orders. Hence, in this paper we propose to move away from the
extremes of working with either arbitrary weakly-stable matchings or super-stable matchings,
and to find a middle-ground when it comes to working with partial preference information.
To this end, we aim to answer two questions from the perspective of a market-designer: i)
How should one handle partial information so as to be able to provide some guarantees with
respect to the underlying true preference orders? ii) What is the trade-off between the amount
of missing information and the quality of a matching that one can achieve? We discuss our
proposal in more detail in the following sections.
1.1 How does one work with partial information?
When agents do not submit full preference orderings, there are several possible ways to cope
with the missing information. For instance, one approach that immediately comes to mind is to
assume that there exists some underlying distribution from which the agents’ true preferences
are drawn, and then use this information to find a “good” matching—which is, say, the one with
the least number of blocking pairs in expectation. However, the success of such an approach
crucially depends on having access to information about the underlying preference distributions
which may not always be available. Therefore, in this paper we make no assumptions on
the underlying preference distributions and instead adopt a prior-free and absolute-worst-case
approach where we assume that any of the linear extensions of the given strict partial orders can
be the underlying true order, and we aim to provide solutions that perform well with respect
to all of them. We note that similar worst-case approaches have been looked at previously, for
instance, by Chiesa et al. [CMA12] in the context of auctions.
The objective we concern ourselves with here is that of minimizing the number of blocking
pairs, which is well-defined and has been considered previously in the context of matching
problems (for instance, see [ABM05; BMM10]). In particular, for a given instance I our aim is
1All our negative results naturally hold for the case when the agents are allowed to specify strict partial orders.
As for our positive results, most of them can be extended for general partial orders, although the resulting bounds
will be worse.
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to return a matchingMopt that has the best worst case—i.e., a matching that has the minimum
maximum ‘regret’ after one realises the true underlying preference orders. (We refer to Mopt
as the minimax optimal solution.) More precisely, let I = (pU , pW ) denote an instance, where
pU = {pu1 , · · · , pun}, pW = {pw1 , · · · , pwn}, U = {ui}i∈{1,2,··· ,n} and W = {wi}i∈{1,2,··· ,n} are
the set of men and women respectively, and pi is the strict partial order submitted by agent
i. Additionally, let C(pi) denote the set of linear extensions of pi, C be the Cartesian product
of the C(pi)s, i.e., C =×i∈U∪W C(pi), bp(M, c) denote the set of blocking pairs that are
associated with the matching M according to some linear extension c ∈ C, and S denote the
set of all possible matchings. Then the matching Mopt that we are interested in is defined as
Mopt = argminM∈S maxc∈C |bp(M, c)|.
While we are aware of just one work by Drummond and Boutilier [DB13] who consider the
minimax regret approach in the context of stable matchings (they consider it mainly in the
context of preference elicitation; see Section 1.4 for more details), the approach, in general,
is perhaps reminiscent, for instance, of the works of Hyafil and Boutilier [HB04] and Lu and
Boutilier [LB11] who looked at the minimax regret solution criterion in the context of mech-
anism design for games with type uncertainty and preference elicitation in voting protocols,
respectively.
Remark: In the usual definition of a minimax regret solution, there is a second term which
measures the ‘regret’ as a result of choosing a particular solution. That is, in the definition
above, it would usually be Mopt = argminM∈S maxc∈C |bp(M, c)| − |bp(Mc, c)|, where Mc is
the optimal matching (with respect to the objective function |bp()|) for the linear extension c.
We do not include this in the definition above because |bp(Mc, c)| = 0 as every instance of the
marriage problem with linear orders has a stable solution (which by definition has zero blocking
pairs). Additionally, the literature on stable matchings uses the term “regret” to denote the
maximum cost associated with a stable matching, where the cost of a matching for an agent
is the rank of its partner in the matching and the maximum is taken over all the agents (for
instance, see [Man+02]). However, here the term regret is used in the context of the minimax
regret solution criterion.
1.2 How does one measure the amount of missing information?
For the purposes of understanding the trade-off between the amount of missing information and
the “quality” of solution one can achieve, we need a way to measure the amount of missing
information in a given instance. There are many possible ways to do this, however in this paper
we adopt the following. For a given instance I, the amount of missing information, δ, is the
fraction of pairwise comparisons one cannot infer from the given strict partial orders. That is,
we know that if every agent submits a strict linear order over n alternatives, then we can infer(
n
2
)
comparisons from it. Now, instead, if an agent i submits a strict partial order pi, then we
denote by δi the fraction of these
(
n
2
)
comparisons one cannot infer from pi (this is the “missing
information” in pi). Our δ here is equal to
1
2n
∑
i∈U∪W δi. Although, given a strict partial order
pi, it is straightforward to calculate δi, we will nevertheless assume throughout that δ is part
of the input. Hence, our definition of an instance will be modified the following way to include
the parameter for missing information: I = (δ, pU , pW ).
Remark: δ = 0 denotes the case when all the preferences are strict linear orders. Also,
for an instance with n agents on each side, the least value of δ when the amount of missing
information is non-zero is 12n
1
(n2)
(this happens in the case where there is only one agent with
just one pairwise comparison missing). However, despite this, in the interest of readability,
we sometimes just write statements of the form “for all δ > 0”. Such statements need to be
understood as being true for only realizable or valid values of δ that are greater than zero.
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1.3 Our Contributions
The focus of our work is on computing the minimax optimal matching, i.e., a matching that,
when given an instance I, minimizes the maximum number of blocking pairs with respect to all
the possible linear extensions (see Section 2.1 for a formal definition of the problem). Towards
this end, we make the following contributions:
• We formally define the problem and show that, interestingly, the problem under consider-
ation is equivalent to the problem of finding a matching that has the minimum number of
super-blocking pairs (i.e., man-woman pairs where each of them weakly-prefers the other
over their current partners).
• While an optimal answer to our question might involve matchings that have man-woman
pairs such that each of them strictly prefers the other over their partners, we start by
focusing our investigation on matchings that do not have such pairs. Given the fact that
any matching with no such pairs are weakly-stable, through this setting we address the
question “given an instance, can we find a weakly-stable matching that performs well, in
terms of minimizing the number of blocking pairs, with respect to all the linear extensions
of the given strict partial orders?” We show that by arbitrarily filling-in the missing
information and computing the resulting stable matching, one can obtain a non-trivial
approximation factor (i.e., one that is o(n2)) for our problem for many values of δ. We
complement this result by showing that, even under severe restrictions on the preferences
of the agents, the factor obtained is asymptotically tight in many cases.
• By assuming a special structure on the agents’ preferences—one where strict weak orders
are specified by just agents on one side and all the missing information is at the bottom of
their preference orders—we show that one can obtain a O(n)-approximation algorithm for
our problem. The proof of the same is via finding a 2-approximation for another problem
(see Problem 3) that might be of independent interest.
• In Section 4 we remove the restriction to weakly-stable matchings and show a general
hardness of approximation result for our problem. Following this, we discuss one possible
approach that can lead to a near-tight approximation guarantee for the same.
1.4 Related Work
There has recently been a number of papers that have looked at problems relating to missing
preference information or uncertainty in preferences in the context of matching.
Drummond and Boutilier [DB13] used the minimax regret solution criterion in order to
drive preference elicitation strategies for matching problems. While they discussed computing
robust matchings subject to a minimax regret solution criteria, their focus was on providing an
NP-completeness result and heuristic preference elicitation strategies for refining the missing
information. In contrast, in addition to focusing on understanding the exact trade-offs between
the amount of missing information and the solution “quality”, we concern ourselves with arriving
at approximation algorithms for computing such robust matchings.
Rastegari et al. [Ras+14] studied a partial information setting in labour markets. However,
again, the focus of this paper was different than ours. They looked at pervasive-employer-
optimal matchings, which are matchings that are employer-optimal (see [Ras+14] for the defini-
tions) with respect to all the underlying linear extensions. In addition, they also discussed how
to identify, in polynomial time, if a matching is employer-optimal with respect to some linear
extension.
Recent work by Aziz et al. [Azi+16] looked at the stable matching problem in settings where
there is uncertainty about the preferences of the agents. They considered three different models
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of uncertainty and primarily studied the complexity of computing the stability probability of a
given matching and the question of finding a matching that will have the highest probability of
being stable. In contrast to their work, in this paper we do not make any underlying distribu-
tional assumptions about the preferences of the agents and instead take an absolute worst-case
approach, which in turn implies that our results hold irrespective of the underlying distribution
on the completions.
Finally, we also briefly mention another line of research which deals with partial information
settings and goes by the name of interview minimization (see, for instance, [RCIL13; DB14]).
One of the main goals in this line of work is to come with a matching that is stable (and
possibly satisfying some other desirable property) by conducting as few ‘interviews’ (which
in turn helps the agents in refining their preferences) as possible. We view this work as an
interesting, orthogonal, direction from the one we pursue in this paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let U and W be two disjoint sets. The sets U and W are colloquially referred to as the set of
men and women, respectively, and |U | = |W | = n. We assume that each agent in U and W has
a true strict linear order (i.e., a ranking without ties) over the agents in the other set, but this
strict linear order may be unknown to the agents or they may be unwilling to completely disclose
the same. Hence, each agent in U and W specifies a strict partial order over the agents in the
other set (which we refer to as their preference order) that is consistent with their underlying
true orders, and pU and pW , respectively, denote the collective preference orders of all the men
and women. For a strict partial order pi associated with agent i, we denote the set of linear
extensions associated with pi by C(pi) and denote by C the Cartesian product of the C(pi)s,
i.e., C =×i∈U∪W C(pi). We refer to the set C as “the set of all completions” where the term
completion refers to an element in C. Also, throughout, we denote strict preferences by ≻ and
use  to denote the relation ‘weakly-prefers’. So, for instance, we say that an agent c strictly
prefers a to b and denote this by a ≻c b and use a c b to denote that either c strictly prefers
a to b or finds them incomparable. As mentioned in the introduction, we restrict our attention
to the case when the strict partial orders submitted by the agents are strict weak orders over
the set of agents in the other set.
Remark: Strict weak orders are defined to be strict partial orders where incomparability
is transitive. Hence, although the term tie is used to mean indifference, it is convenient to
think of strict weak orders as rankings with ties. Therefore, throughout this paper, whenever
we say that agent c finds a and b to be tied, we mean that c finds a and b to be incomparable.
Additionally, we will use the terms ties and incomparabilities interchangeably.
An instance I of the stable marriage problem (SM) is defined as I = (δ, pU , pw), where
δ denotes the amount of missing information in that instance and this in turn, as defined in
Section 1.2, is the average number of pairwise comparisons that are missing from the instance,
and pU and pW are as defined above. Given an instance I, the aim is usually to come up with
a matching M—which in turn is a set of disjoint pairs (m,w), where m ∈ U and w ∈W—that
is stable. There are different notions of stability that have been proposed and below we define
two of them that are relevant to our paper: i) weak-stability and ii) super-stability. However,
before we look at their definitions we introduce the following terminology that will be used
throughout this paper. (Note that in the definitions below we implicitly assume that in any
matching M all the agents are matched. This is so because of the standard assumption that is
made in the literature on SM (i.e., the stable marriage problem where every agent has a strict
linear order over all the agents in the other set) that an agent always prefers to be matched to
some agent than to remain unmatched.)
Definition 1 (blocking pair/obvious blocking pair). Given an instance I and a matching M
associated with I, (m,w) is said to be a blocking pair associated with M if w ≻m M(m) and
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m ≻w M(w). The term blocking pair is usually used in situations where the preferences of
the agents are strict linear orders, so in cases where the preferences of the agents have missing
information, we refer to such a pair as an obvious blocking pair.
Definition 2 (super-blocking pair). Given an instance I where the agents submit partial pref-
erence orders and a matching M associated with I, we say that (m,w) is a super-blocking pair
associated with M if w m M(m) and m w M(w).
Given the definitions above we can now define weak-stability and super-stability.
Definition 3 (weakly-stable matching). Given an instance I and matching M associated with
I, M is so said to be weakly-stable with respect to I if it does not have any obvious blocking
pairs. When the preferences of the agents are strict linear orders, such a matching is just
referred to as a stable matching.
Definition 4 (super-stable matching). Given an instance I and matching M associated with
I, M is so said to be super-stable with respect to I if it does not have any super-blocking pairs.
2.1 What problems do we consider?
As mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in finding the minimax optimal matching
where the objective is to minimize the number of blocking pairs, i.e., to find, from the set S of
all possible matchings, a matching that has the minimum maximum number of blocking pairs
with respect to all the completions. This is formally defined below.
Problem 1 (δ-minimax-matching). Given a δ ∈ [0, 1] and an instance I = (δ′, pU , pW ), where
δ′ ≤ δ is the amount of missing information and pU , pW are the preferences submitted by men
and women respectively, compute Mopt where Mopt = argminM∈S maxc∈C |bp(M, c)|.
Although the problem defined above is our main focus, for the rest of this paper we will
be talking in terms of the following problem which concerns itself with finding an approx-
imately super-stable matching (i.e., a super-stable matching with the minimum number of
super-blocking pairs). As we will see below, the reason we do the same is because both the
problems are equivalent.
Problem 2 (δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching). Given a δ ∈ [0, 1] and an instance I = (δ′, pU ,
pW ), where δ
′ ≤ δ is the amount of missing information and pU , pW are the preferences submitted
by men and women respectively, compute MSSopt where MSSopt = argminM∈S |super-bp(M)| and
super-bp(M) is the set of super-blocking pairs associated with M for the instance I.
Below we show that both the problems described above are equivalent. However, before
that we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let M be a matching associated with some instance I = (δ, pU , pW ), α denote the
maximum number of blocking pairs associated with M for any completion of I, and β denote
the number of super-blocking pairs associated with M for the instance I. Then, α = β.
Proof. First, it is easy to see that if there are α blocking pairs associated with M for a com-
pletion, then there are at least as many super-blocking pairs associated with M. Therefore,
α ≤ β.
Next, we will show that if β is the number of super-blocking pairs associated with M, then
I has at least one completion such that it has β number of blocking pairs associated with M.
To see this, for each mi ∈ U and for each wj ∈ W such that (mi, wj) is a super-blocking pair,
do the following:
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• if mi finds wj incomparable toM(mi), then construct a new partial order p′mi for mi such
that it is the same as pmi except for the fact that in p
′
mi
we have that mi strictly prefers
wj over M(mi).
• if wj finds mi incomparable to M(wj), then construct a new partial order p′wj for wj such
that it is the same as pwj except for the fact that in p
′
wj
we have that wj strictly prefers
mi over M(wj).
Once the above steps are done, if there still exists any agent whose preference order is
partial, then complete it arbitrarily. Now, consider this instance I ′ that is obtained. Then,
again, it is easy to see that every (mi, wj) which was a super-blocking pair associated with M
in I forms a blocking pair in M with respect to I ′. Therefore, this completion has β blocking
pairs, and since the maximum number of blocking pairs in any completion is α, we have that
β ≤ α. Combining this with the case above, we have that α = β.
Given the lemma above, we can now prove our theorem.
Theorem 2. For any δ ∈ [0, 1], the δ-minimax-matching and δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
problems are equivalent.
Proof. To see this, let I = (δ′, pU , pW ) be some instance, where δ′ ≤ δ, andM be some matching
associated with I. We show thatM is an optimal solution for the δ-minimax-matching problem
if and only if it is an optimal solution for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem.
( =⇒ ) Let us suppose that M is not an optimal solution for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-
matching problem. This implies that there exists some other M′ such that |super-bp(M′)|
< |super-bp(M)|. However, from Lemma 1 we know that the maximum number of blocking
pairs associated withM′ for any completion with respect to I is equal to |super-bp(M′)|, which
in turn contradicts the fact that M was optimal for the δ-minimax-matching problem.
(⇐= ) We can prove this analogously.
For the rest of this paper, we assume that we are always dealing with instances which do
not have a super-stable matching as this can be checked in polynomial-time [Irv94, Theorem
3.4]. So, now, in the context of the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem, it is easy to show
that if the number of super-blocking pairs k in the optimal solution is a constant, then we can
solve it in polynomial-time. We state this in the theorem below. Later, in Section 4, we will
see that the problem is NP-hard, even to approximate.
Theorem 3. An exact solution to the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem can be computed
in O(n2(k+1)) time, where k is the number of super-blocking pairs in the optimal solution.
Proof. We will describe the algorithm below whose main idea is based on the following obser-
vation.
For an instance I, consider its optimal solution Mopt and let the k super-blocking pairs
associated with Mopt be B = {(m1, w1), · · · , (mk, wk)}. Next, for each such pair (mi, wi), put
mi (wi) at the end of wi’s (mi’s) preference list (i.e., make every other man (woman), except
those involved in another blocking pair with wi (mi), rank better than mi (wi)). If either of
them are involved in multiple blocking pairs in B, then make those partners as incomparable at
the end of the preference list. Let us call the new instance I ′. Notice that Mopt is super-stable
with respect to I ′ as the pairs in B are no longer blocking and no new blocking pairs are created
because of our manipulations to the preference list.
Given the above observation, we can now describe the exponential algorithm.
• Initially j = 1. Given a j, try out every possible set of pairs of size j to see if they are the
right blocking pairs.
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• For each set generated in the previous step, modify the original instance I to I ′ as de-
scribed above and see if I ′ has a super-stable matching (this can be done in polynomial
time). If yes, then return the super-stable matching as that is the solution. Otherwise, if
none of the sets of size j result in a “yes”, then go back to step 1 and try again with the
next value of j.
Now, it is easy to see that we end up with the optimal solution this way since we try all
possible sets of blocking pairs. As for the time, we know that for each j we have at most (n2)j
choices of sets and for each set we need at most 2n2 time to do the necessary manipulations to
the instance and to check for super-stability. Hence, the total time required is
∑k
j=1 2n
2j+2 =
O(n2(k+1)).
3 Investigating weakly-stable matchings
In this section we focus on situations where obvious blocking pairs are not permitted in the
final matching. In particular, we explore the space of weakly-stable matchings and ask whether
it is possible to find weakly-stable matchings that also provide good approximations to the
δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem (and thus the δ-minimax-matching problem).
3.1 Approximating δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching with weakly-stable match-
ings
It has previously been established that a matching is weakly-stable if and only if it is stable
with respect to at least one completion [Man+02, Section 1.2]. Therefore, given this result,
one immediate question that arises in the context of approximating the δ-min-bp-super-stable-
matching problem is “what if we just fill in the missing information arbitrarily and then compute
a stable matching associated with such a completion?” This is the question we consider here,
and we show that weakly-stable matchings do give a non-trivial (i.e., one that is o(n2), as
any matching has only O(n2) super-blocking pairs) approximation bound for our problem for
certain values of δ. The proof of the following theorem is through a simple application of the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Theorem 4. For any δ > 0 and an instance I = (δ′, pU , pW ) where δ′ ≤ δ, any weakly-
stable matching with respect to I gives an O
(
min
{
n3δ, n2
√
δ
})
-approximation for the δ-min-
bp-super-stable-matching problem.
Proof. Let M be a weakly-stable matching associated with I. By the definition of weakly-
stable matchings we know that M does not have any obvious blocking pairs. This implies
that for every super-blocking pair (m,w) associated with M, either m finds w incomparable to
his partner M(m) or w finds m incomparable to her partner M(w). If it is the former then
we refer to the super-blocking pair (m,w) as one that is associated with m and if not we say
that it is associated with w. Next, let us suppose that there are d agents who have a blocking
pair associated with them and let bi denote the number of super-blocking pairs associated with
agent i. So, now, the number of super-blocking pairs, |super-bp(M)|, associated with M can
be written as
|super-bp(M)| =
d∑
i=1
bi ≤
d∑
i=1
(ℓi − 1) =
d∑
i=1
ℓi − d, (1)
where ℓi refers to the length of largest tie associated with agent i and the inequality follows
from the definition of an association of a super-blocking pair with an agent.
8
Additionally, for each i ∈ {1, · · · , d}, we know that at least (ℓi2) pairwise comparisons are
missing with respect to i (since i has a tie of length ℓi). Therefore, using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, we have that
d∑
i=1
(
ℓi
2
)
=
1
2
d∑
i=1
ℓ2i − ℓi ≥
1
2

1
d
(
d∑
i=1
ℓi
)2
−
d∑
i=1
ℓi

 . (2)
Also, since the total amount of missing information δ′ in the instance I is less than or equal
to δ and since each ℓi ≥ 2 (as it is a weak order and a tie, if it exists, is of length at least 2) we
have that
d ≤
d∑
i=1
(ℓi − 1) ≤
d∑
i=1
(
ℓi
2
)
≤ δ(2n)
(
n
2
)
≤ δn3. (3)
Now, using Equation 3 and the fact that d is also upper-bounded by 2n (as there are only
2n agents in the instance), we have that d ≤ min{2n, δn3}. Therefore, using Equation 2 and
again using the fact that δ is the maximum amount of missing information, we have,
1
2

1
d
(
d∑
i=1
ℓi
)2
−
d∑
i=1
ℓi

 ≤ d∑
i=1
(
ℓi
2
)
≤ δ(2n)
(
n
2
)
. (4)
This in turn implies that if we solve for
∑d
i=1 ℓi, we have,
d∑
i=1
ℓi ≤ 1
2
(
d+
√
d2 + 8dn2(n− 1)δ
)
< d+
√
d2 + 8dn2(n− 1)δ.
So, now, we can use the fact that d ≤ min{2n, δn3} to see that
d∑
i=1
ℓi − d ≤ min{4n3δ, 5n2
√
δ}.
Finally, this along with Equation 1 gives our result since the number of super-blocking pairs
in the optimal solution is at least 1 (since, as mentioned in Section 2.1, we are only considering
instances that do not have a super-stable matching).
3.2 Can we do better when restricted to weakly-stable matchings?
While Theorem 4 established an approximation factor for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
problem when considering only weakly-stable matchings, it was simply based on arbitrarily
filling-in the missing information. Therefore, there remains the question as to whether one can
be clever about handling the missing information and as a result obtain improved approximation
bounds. In this section we consider this question and show that for many values of δ the
approximation factor obtained in Theorem 4 is asymptotically the best one can achieve when
restricted to weakly-stable matchings.
Theorem 5. For any δ ∈ [ 16
n2
, 14 ], if there exists an α-approximation algorithm for δ-min-bp-
super-stable-matching that always returns a matching that is weakly-stable, then α ∈ Ω
(
n2
√
δ
)
.
Moreover, this result is true even if we allow only one side to specify ties and also insist that
all the ties need to be at the top of the preference order.
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Men
m1 : w1 ≻ WB1 ≻ · · · ≻WBz ≻ WF\{1}
m2 : w1 ≻ w2 ≻ [· · · ]
m3 : w2 ≻ w3 ≻ WF\{2,3} ≻ WS
m4 : w2 ≻ w4 ≻ WF\{2,4} ≻ WS
...
mn
2
: w2 ≻ wn
2
≻ WF\{2,n
2
} ≻ WS
mb0 : w1 ≻ wb0 ≻WB1\{b0} ≻ WS\B1 ≻WF\{1}
...
mb1−1 : w1 ≻ wb1−1 ≻ WB1\{b1−1} ≻WS\B1 ≻WF\{1}
mb1 : w1 ≻ wb1 ≻WB2\{b1} ≻ WS\B2 ≻WF\{1}
..
.
mb2−1 : w1 ≻ wb2−1 ≻ WB2\{b2−1} ≻WS\B2 ≻WF\{1}
...
mbz−1 : w1 ≻ wbz−1 ≻WBz\{bz−1} ≻ WS\Bz ≻WF\{1}
...
mbz−1 : w1 ≻ wbz−1 ≻WBz\{bz−1} ≻WS\Bz ≻ WF\{1}
Women
w1 : m2 ≻ m1 ≻ [· · · ]
w2 : m2 ≻M(F∪S)\{1} ≻ m1
w3 : m1 ≻ m3 ≻ [· · · ]
w4 : m1 ≻ m4 ≻ [· · · ]
...
wn
2
: m1 ≻ mn
2
≻ [· · · ]
wb0 : M
T
B1\{b0}
≻MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb0 ≻MF\{1}
..
.
wb1−1 : M
T
B1\{b1−1}
≻MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb1−1 ≻MF\{1}
wb1 : M
T
B1\{b1}
≻MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb1 ≻MF\{1}
...
wb2−1 : M
T
B1\{b2−1}
≻MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb2−1 ≻MF\{1}
...
wbz−1 : M
T
B1\{bz−1}
≻MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mbz−1 ≻MF\{1}
..
.
wbz−1 : M
T
B1\{bz−1}
≻MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mbz−1 ≻MF\{1}
Figure 1: The instance I that is used in the proof of Theorem 5
Proof. At a very high-level, the key idea in this proof is to create an instance I such that if we
insist on there being no obvious blocking pairs, then this results in some kind of a “cascading
effect”, thus in turn causing a very sharp blow-up in the number of super-blocking pairs. With
this intuition, we first construct an instance I as shown in Figure 1, where ties appear only on
the women’s side. Furthermore, we define the following:
• y = n
√
δ
2 , z =
n
2y (for simplicity we assume that y and z are integers; we can appropriately
modify the proof if that is not the case)
• bj = n2 + jy + 1,∀j ∈ [0, · · · z], Bi = {bi−1, · · · , bi − 1},∀i ∈ [1, · · · z]
• F = {1, · · · , n2}, S = {n2 + 1, · · · , n}
• WX (MX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X in the increasing
order of their indices
• W TX (MTX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X as tied
• [· · · ] : place all the remaining alternatives in some strict order.
Next, we will show that all the weakly-stable matchings associated with I have O
(
n2
√
δ
)
super-blocking pairs, whereas the optimal solution has exactly one super-blocking pair. To
do this, first note that the optimal solution Mopt associated with the instance is Mopt =
{(m1, w1), (m2, w2), · · · , (mn, wn)}, where (m2, w1) is the only super-blocking pair (and it is an
obvious blocking pair). Also, it can be verified that the total amount of missing information in
I is at most δ. So, next, we prove the following claim.
Claim 1. If M is a weakly-stable matching associated with the instance I, then ∀i ∈ {n2 +
1, · · · , n},M(mi) 6= wi.
Proof. First, note that in any weakly-stable matching m2 will always be matched to w1 as
otherwise it will result in an obvious blocking pair. Next, let us suppose that there exists an
i ∈ {n2 + 1, · · · , n} such that M(mi) = wi. Now, we will consider the following two cases and
show that in both the cases this is impossible.
10
Case 1. m1 is matched to a woman w ∈ WF\{1} in M: In this case one can see that (m1, wi)
forms an obvious blocking pair.
Case 2. m1 is matched to a woman w ∈WS in M: Note that if this is the case, then there is
at least one j ∈ S such that mj is matched with a woman w ∈ WF . Now, notice that (mj , wi)
forms an obvious blocking pair.
Given the claim above, consider a man m whose index is in some block Bj and let his index
value be k. From the way the preferences are defined, it is easy to see that in any weakly-stable
matching, m will be matched to a woman w whose index lies in the same block Bj (because
otherwise it will result in an obvious blocking pair). At the same time, from the claim above
we know that this w’s index is not k. Now, let us consider the woman wbj−1 who is the woman
with the highest index value in Bj and let m
′ denote the man who is matched to wbj−1 in a
weakly-stable matching. From the observation above we know that m′ has an index value in
Bj. Additionally, given the way the preferences are defined for m
′ and using the fact that any
woman wp such that p ∈ Bj finds all the men in Bj \ {p} to be incomparable, one can see that
m′ forms (|Bj | − 2) super-blocking pairs (with all the women in Bj except wbj−1 and the one
with the same index value as m′). Also, by using the same argument again, but with respect to
wbj−2, we can show that partner of wbj−2 in the matching forms at least (|Bj |−3) super-blocking
pairs (with all women except wbj−2, wbj−1, and the one with the same index). Continuing this
way we see that each block Bj contributes O(|Bj |2) super-blocking pairs. And so, since there
are z blocks and |Bj| = y for all j, we have that there are O(n2
√
δ) super-blocking pairs in any
weakly-stable matching.
3.3 The case of one-sided top-truncated preferences: An O(n) approximation
algorithm for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
Although Theorem 5 is an inherently negative result, in this section we consider an interesting
restriction on the preferences of the agents and show how this negative result can be circum-
vented. In particular, we consider the case where only agents on one side are allowed to specify
ties and all the ties need to be at the bottom. Such a restriction has been looked at previ-
ously in the context of matching problems and as noted by Irving and Manlove [IM08] is one
that appears in practise in the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS). Additionally,
restricting ties to only at the bottom models a very well-studied class of preferences known as
top-truncated preferences, which has received considerable attention in the context of voting
(see, for instance, [BFLR12]).
Top-truncated preferences model scenarios where an agent is certain about their most pre-
ferred choices, but is indifferent among the remaining ones or is unsure about them. More
precisely, in our setting, the preference order submitted by, say, a woman w is said to be a top-
truncated order if it is a linear order over a subset of U and the remaining men are all considered
to be incomparable by w. In this section we consider one-sided top-truncated preferences, i.e.,
where only men or women are allowed to specify top-truncated orders, and show an O(n)-
approximation algorithm for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching under this setting. (Without loss
of generality we assume throughout that only the women submit strict weak orders.) Although
arbitrarily filling-in the missing information and computing the resulting weakly-stable match-
ing can lead to an O(n2√δ)-approximate matching even for this restricted case (see Appendix A
for an example), we will see that not all weakly-stable matchings are “bad” and that in fact the
O(n)-approximate matching we obtain is weakly-stable.
However, in order to arrive at this result, we first introduce the following problem which
might be of independent interest. (To the best of our knowledge, this has not been previously
considered in the literature.) Informally, in this problem we are given an instance I and are
asked if we can delete some of the agents to ensure that the instance, when restricted to the
remaining agents, will have a perfect super-stable matching.
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Problem 3 (min-delete-super-stable-matching). Given an instance I = (δ, pU , pW ), where δ
is the amount of missing information and pU , pW are the preferences submitted by men and
women respectively, compute the set D of minimum cardinality such that the instance I−D =
(δ−D, pU\D, pW\D), where δ−D = 1|(U∪W )\D|
∑
i∈(U∪W )\D δi, has a perfect super-stable matching
(i.e., every agent in (U ∪W ) \D is matched in a super-stable matching).
Below we first show a 2-approximation for the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem
when restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences. Subsequently, we use this
result in order to get an O(n)-approximation for our problem. However, before that, we intro-
duce the following terminology which will be used throughout in this section.
• An instance I of the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem can also be thought of as
the set of agents along with their preference lists. Initially for every agent this list has all
the agents in the other set listed in some order. Now, during the course of our algorithm
sometimes we use the operation “delete(a, b)” which removes agent a from b’s list and b
from a’s. After such a deletion (or after a series of such deletions) our instance now refers
to the set of agents along with their updated lists.
• We say that a matchingM is internally super-stable with respect to an instance I ifM is
super-stable with respect to the instance that is obtained by only considering the matched
agents in M (i.e., consider I and remove all the agents who are not matched in M from
I).
• We say that an instance I with no ties has an exposed rotation ρ = (m1, w1), · · · , (mr, wr)
if, in I, wi is the first agent in mi’s list and wi+1 is the second agent in mi’s list (here
(i+ 1) is done modulo r).
Proposition 6. Algorithm 1 is a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for the min-delete-
super-stable-matching problem when restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences.
Proof. The main idea for Algorithm 1 is inspired by the work of Tan [Tan90] who looked at the
problem of finding the maximum internally stable matching for the stable roommates problem
(which is equivalent to the problem of finding the minimum number of agents to delete so
that the rest of the agents will have a stable matching when the instance is just restricted to
themselves). Informally, at a very high level, the key idea in Tan’s algorithm was to show
that some of the entries in each agent’s list can be deleted by running the proposal-rejection
sequence like in Gale-Shapley algorithm and through rotation eliminations, while at the same
time maintaining at least one solution of the maximum size. As we will see below, this is
essentially what we do here as well, adapting this idea as necessary for our case when there are
ties on one side but only at the bottom.
Before we go on to the main lemmas, let us suppose that I = (δ, pU , pW ) is an arbitrary
instance of the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem when restricted to the case of one-
sided top-truncated preferences, where δ is the amount of missing information, pU , pW are the
preference orders submitted by the men and women, respectively, and |U | = |W | = n. Also, let
Dopt be the optimal solution for this instance. This in turn implies that we can form a perfect
and internally super-stable matching of size k = n − Dopt2 , and that in fact k is the maximum
size of any such matching (as otherwise Dopt cannot be optimal). Next, for now, let us assume
the correctness of the following lemmas (note that all the instances we talk about in this section
are restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences). We will prove them later, in
Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.
Lemma 7. Let I1 denote some instance and I2 denote the instance returned by the procedure
proposeWith(A,I1), where the set A represents the proposing side. If there exists a matching of
size t in I1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching of size
t in I2 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
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Procedure: proposeWith(A, I)
1: assign each agent a ∈ A to be free
2: while some a ∈ A is free do
3: b← first agent on a’s list
4: if b is already engaged to agent p && b finds p and a incomparable then
5: delete (a, b)
6: else
7: if b is already engaged to agent p then
8: assign p to be free
9: end if
10: assign a and b to be engaged
11: for each agent c in b’s list such that a ≻b c do
12: delete (c, b)
13: end for
14: end if
15: end while
16: for each man m do
17: w← first woman on m’s list
18: if there exists a man m′ such that w finds m and m′ incomparable then
19: delete (m′, w)
20: end if
21: end for ⊲ deletions in this loop only happen once and results in the removal of all the remaining ties
22: return I ⊲ this returns the updated lists
Main:
Input: a one-sided top-truncated instance I = (δ, pU , pW )
23: I′ ← proposeWith(U, I)
24: I′ ← proposeWith(W, I′)
25: while there exists some exposed rotation (m1, w1), (m2, w2), · · · , (mr, wr) in I
′ do
26: delete (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , r}
27: I′ ← proposeWith(U,I′)
28: I′ ← proposeWith(W,I′)
29: end while
30: M← for all men m ∈ U , match m with the only woman in his list
31: construct G = (V,E) where V = U ∪W , (m,w) ∈ E if (m,w) is a super-blocking pair in M w.r.t. I
32: D ← minimum vertex cover of G
33: for each a ∈ D do
34: D ← D ∪M(a)
35: end for
36: return (D,M)
Algorithm 1: For the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences, the setD returned by the algo-
rithm is a 2-approximation for the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem and the matching
M returned is an O(n)-approximation for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
Lemma 8. Let I1 denote some instance that does not contain any ties, (m1, w1), (m2, w2), · · · ,
(mr, wr) be a rotation that is exposed in I1, and I2 be the instance that is obtained by deleting
the entries (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , r} from I1. If there exists a matching of size t in I1 that
is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching of size t in I2 that is
internally super-stable with respect to I.
Lemma 9. If I1 is an instance that does not contain any exposed rotation, then the list of every
man in I1 has only one woman and vice versa.
Given the above lemmas and given the fact that the instance I has an internally super-stable
matching of size k = n− Dopt2 , we can start with the instance I and repeatedly apply Lemma 7
and see that the instance Iˆ that we obtain after line 24 of Algorithm 1 has a matching of size
k that is internally super-stable matching with respect to I. Next, starting with the instance
Iˆ, we can again repeatedly apply Lemma 8 and see that the instance I ′ that remains after
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line 29 of Algorithm 1 also has a matching of size k that is internally super-stable matching
with respect to I. Additionally, from Lemma 9 we know that in this instance each man has only
one woman in his list and vice versa. So, now, consider the matching M that can be obtained
by matching each man with the only woman in his list. Next, consider the bipartite graph
G = (V,E) where V = U ∪W and (m,w) ∈ E if (m,w) is a super-blocking pair with respect
to the original instance I, and consider a minimum vertex cover C of G. We show below that
k ≤ n− |C|2 .
Suppose this is false and that I has an internally super-stable matching of size greater than
n − |C|2 . Now, from the discussion above, we know that this implies I ′ also has a matching
of size greater than n − |C|2 such that it is internally super-stable with respect to I. This in
turn implies that we can remove less than |C| agents and have a matching that is internally
super-stable with respect to I. That is, we can remove less than |C| agents and also at the
same time ensure that for every (m,w) ∈ E, this matching has only one of m or w matched in
it, for if otherwise it will not be internally super-stable with respect to I. However, this implies
that |C| is not the size of the minimum vertex cover of G, and hence we have a contradiction.
Now, to get our approximation bound, consider the set D that is returned by the algorithm.
We know that D ≤ 2|C| ≤ 4(n−k) = 2Dopt, where the first inequality arises because of lines 33-
35 in Algorithm 1 and the second inequality uses the observation above that k ≤ n− |C|2 . Finally,
it is easy to see that all the steps can be done in polynomial-time (it is well-known through the
Ko˝nig’s Theorem that one can find a minimum vertex cover of a bipartite graph in polynomial-
time).
Given Proposition 6, we can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10. For any δ > 0, Algorithm 1 is a polynomial-time O(n)-approximation algorithm
for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem when restricted to the case of one-sided top-
truncated preferences. Moreover, the O(n)-approximate matching that is returned is also weakly-
stable.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance I of the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem when
restricted to the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences. Let Mopt be the optimal solution
associated with I. Next, consider the same instance I for the min-delete-super-stable-matching
problem and let us consider the matching M that is returned by Algorithm 1 for this instance.
Also, let Dopt be the optimal solution of the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem for the
instance I and D be the set that is returned by Algorithm 1. (We can assume throughout that
Dopt ≥ 1, for if otherwise this implies that it has a super-stable matching, and as mentioned
in Section 2.1 we do not consider such instances.) First, it is easy to see that this matching is
weakly-stable (because in every instance that results after the first proposal-rejection sequence
(which is in line 23), a matching that is formed by matching each man with the first woman on
his list will be weakly-stable). Second, note that we can rewrite M as M = M1 ∪M2, where
M1 = M\ {∪a∈D(a,M(a))} and M2 = ∪a∈D(a,M(a)). Now, if S1 (S2) denotes the number
of super-blocking pairs associated with men in M1 (M2), then
|super-bp(M)| = S1 + S2
≤
(
n− |D|
2
)
· |D|
2
+
|D|
2
· n
≤ n · |D|
≤ 2n · |Dopt|, (5)
where the second step is using the fact that the men inM1 can form at most |D|2 super-blocking
pairs with women outside ofM1 and the men in M2 can in the worst case form a blocking pair
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with all the women, and the last step is using the fact that Dopt ≥ 1 and that |D| ≤ 2 · |Dopt|,
which we know is true by Proposition 6.
Also, if Mopt is the optimal solution for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem, then
we know that
|super-bp(Mopt)| ≥ |Dopt|
2
, (6)
as otherwise one can delete all the men who are involved in super-blocking pairs in Mopt and
their corresponding partners and get a super-stable matching on the remaining agents.
Finally, using Equations 5 and 6 we have our theorem.
3.3.1 Proof of Lemma 7
Let us first prove the following claims. However, before that we introduce the following termi-
nology. When the procedure proposeWith(A,I1) is executed, for every run of the while loop in
line 2 with respect to an agent a, we can track the instance that is currently being used. That
is, initially we have the instance I1 and this is referred to as the instance that is “currently
being used” by the agent a1 where a1 is the first agent with respect whom the while loop is
executed. Now, after the first run of the while loop (w.r.t. a1) we have an updated instance
(because of some delete operations that happened in lines 3-14), say, Icurr. Therefore, the next
time the while loop is run with respect to some agent a2, this is the instance that is “currently
being used” with respect to a2. We use this terminology in the following claim.
Claim 2. Let a ∈ A be an agent who is assigned to be ‘free’ in the procedure proposeWith(A,I1),
Icurr denote the instance that is currently being used with respect to a, and I ′1 be the instance
obtained by running lines 3-14 with respect to agent a. If there exists a matching of size t in
Icurr that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a matching of size t in
I ′1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Proof. First, note that every time the procedure proposeWith() is called with the set A, the
agents in this set do not have any ties. This is because, when proposeWith() is called with the
set of women W for the first time in line 24, all ties are already broken due to the first call of
proposeWith() with the set of men in line 23. Therefore, in all the arguments below we do not
need to concern ourselves with issues that can arise as a result of the agents in A having ties.
Now, to prove this claim we consider the following two cases separately.
1. when b, the first agent in a’s list, is either engaged to p, but prefers a to p, or is not
engaged currently
2. when b is engaged to p ∈ A and finds p and a incomparable
Case 1: In this case the only change that happens to the instance Icurr are due to deletions of
the form (c, b) where a ≻b c. Let the resulting instance be I ′1. So, in order to prove that I ′1 has
a matching of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to I, we just need to prove that
there exists a matching of size t in Icurr that is internally super-stable matching with respect
to I and does not have any matches of the form (c, b). Now, let us suppose that’s not the case
and that in every matching M of size t in Icurr that is internally super-stable with respect to I
there exists such a pair. This in turn implies that a is unmatched in M, for if otherwise (a, b)
will form an obvious-blocking pair. Hence, we can form the matching M′ = (M\ (c, b))∪ (a, b).
Note that M′ is internally-stable with respect to I as this does not introduce any new super-
blocking pair (since b is the first agent on a’s list and b does not block any other agent in M′ as
he prefers the new partner over his old partner c) and has the same size asM. This in turn is a
contradiction and hence we have that I ′1 has a matching of size t that is internally super-stable
with respect to I.
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Case 2: In this case, the only change that happens to the instance Icurr is the deletion of (a, b).
Let the resulting instance be I ′1. So, in order to prove that I ′1 has a matching of size t that is
internally super-stable with respect to I, we just need to prove that there exists a matching of
size t in Icurr that is internally super-stable matching with respect to I and does not have any
matches of the form (a, b). Suppose that’s not the case and that every matching M of size t in
Icurr that is internally super-stable matching with respect to I has (a, b). This in turn implies
that p is unmatched in M, for if otherwise (p, b) will form a super-blocking pair (since b is the
first agent on p’s list and b finds p and a incomparable). Hence, we can now form the matching
M′ = (M \ (a, b)) ∪ (p, b), which is internally super-stable with respect to I as this does not
introduce any new super-blocking pair (since i) b is the first agent on p’s list and ii) b does not
block any other agent in M′ as it finds a and b incomparable and so if he blocks someone now
he also blocked them when (a, b) was present, thus contradicting the fact thatM was internally
super-stable) and has the same size as M. This in turn is a contradiction and hence, again, we
have that I ′1 has a matching of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Next, we prove the following claim whose proof is omitted since it can be proved in a way
that is similar to Case 2 in the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3. Let m be a man, w be the first woman on m’s list, I3 be some instance obtained after
line 15, and I4 be the instance obtained after deleting each (m′, w) in line 19. If there exists
a matching of size t in I3 that is internally super-stable with respect to I, then there exists a
matching of size t in I4 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
Given the two lemmas above, we are now ready to prove Lemma 7. First, starting with I1
and by repeatedly using Claim 2 with respect to each free agent a ∈ A, we can see that the
instance I ′1 that we obtain at the end of the while loop (i.e., line 15) has a matching of size t
that is internally super-stable matching with respect to the initial instance I. Second, starting
with I ′1 and by repeatedly using Claim 3 with respect to each man, we can see that the instance
I2 that is returned from the procedure proposeWith(A,I1) has a matching of size t that is
internally super-stable with respect to the instance I. This in turn proves our lemma.
3.3.2 Proof of Lemma 8
Let M be a matching of size t in I1 that is internally super-stable with respect to I. We will
consider the following two cases separately and show that in each case there exists a matching
of size t in I2 that is internally super-stable with respect to I.
1. for all i ∈ {1, · · · , r}, (mi, wi) ∈ M
2. there exists some j ∈ {1, · · · , r} such that (mj, wj) /∈ M
Case 1: Consider the matching M′ that is obtained by removing (mi, wi) and instead
adding (mi, wi+1) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , r} (here i + 1 is done modulo r). Now, it is easy to see
that this does not lead to any new internal super-blocking pairs with respect to I. Hence, M′
is internally super-stable with respect to I, has the same size as M (as every agent matched in
M is also matched in M′), and all the matched pairs in M′ are in I2.
Case 2: First, note that if (mi, wi) /∈ M for all i ∈ {1, · · · , r}, then we are done as the only
deleted entries in I2 are (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , r}. So this implies that we can, without loss
of generality, consider the smallest k ∈ {1, · · · , r} such that (mj , wj) /∈M for all j ∈ {1, · · · , k},
but (mk+1, wk+1) ∈ M (since there is at least one j such that (mj, wj) /∈ M, this can always
be done because we can re-index the rotation so that the first element (m1, w1) of the rotation
is not in M). Let I ′2 be the instance that is formed by deleting the entries (mi, wi) for all
i ∈ {1, · · · , k + 1}. Below, we will show that I ′2 satisfies the conditions of the lemma, i.e., we
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show that I ′2 has a matching of size t that is internally super-stable with respect to I. And so
once we have that, we can just repeat this argument until we get to the instance I2.
To see why I ′2 satisfies the conditions of the lemma, notice that mk needs to be unmatched
in M, for if otherwise then (mk, wk+1) will be an obvious blocking-pair. This in turn implies
that we can construct another matching M′ such that M′ = (M\ (mk+1, wk+1))∪ (mk, wk+1),
both of them have the same size, and all the matched pairs in M′ are in I ′2. Also, one can see
that this does not lead to any new super-blocking pairs since i) wk+1 improved and so will not
be part of any new super-blocking pair and ii) mk does not form a super-blocking pair as it is
matched to the agent who is second in his list and wk who is first in his list, if matched in M,
has to be matched to someone better (as mk is the last agent in wk’s list).
3.3.3 Proof of Lemma 9
First, note that throughout an agent a is in b’s list if and only if b is in a’s list. Second, we
prove the following claim.
Claim 4. Let I2 be some initial instance, I3 be the instance that is obtained after running the
procedure proposeWith() with the men’s side proposing, and I4 be the instance that is obtained
after running the procedure proposeWith() with the women’s side proposing. For any two agents
a and b in I4, if a is the only agent in b’s list, then b is the only agent in a’s list.
Proof. To prove our claim let us consider the following two cases in the instance I3.
1. there exists a woman w1 such that m1 is the only man on w1’s list, but m1 has at least
one other woman other than w1 in his list
2. there exists a man m1 such that w1 is the only woman on m1’s list, but w1 has at least
one other man other than m1 in her list
Case 1: Since we are looking at I3, note that w1 must be the first woman on m1’s list, for
if otherwise there is some other man, say, mk who is not engaged (because w1 has only m1 in
her list). However, we know that this is not possible and so w1 is the first woman on m1’s list.
Therefore, now, when we run the procedure proposeWith() with the women’s side proposing,
w1 will propose to m1 and as a result m1 will delete all other women from his list. And so, in
I4, w1 is the only agent in m1’s list and vice versa.
Case 2: For this case, let us suppose that even after running the procedure proposeWith() with
the women’s side proposing, w1 still has at least one other man other than m1 in her list (if not,
then we are already done). Let this man be m2. This in turn implies that in the engagement
relation that results, at least one of the women, say, wk, is not engaged (because m1 has only w1
in his list). However, we know that this is not possible as this would imply that the engagement
relation has an obvious blocking pair (mk, wk), where mk is the last agent on wk’s list (and we
know this cannot happen since we are just running the same proposal-rejection sequence as in
the Gale-Shapley algorithm).
Given the observations above, let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists
an instance I1 such that it does not have any exposed rotation but has at least one agent who
has a list of size greater than one. Using Claim 4 and the fact that an agent a is in b’s list if
and only if b is in a’s list, we can assume without loss of generality that there exists a man m1
such that he has at least two women in his list. Let w1 and w2 be the first and second woman,
respectively, in m1’s list. Since I1 is obtained after running the procedure proposeWith() twice,
once each with the men’s and women’s side proposing, from Claim 4 we know that m2, who
is the last man on w2’s list, too has at least two women in his list as otherwise w2 would also
have just one man m2 in her list. Let w3 be the second woman in m2’s list. Now, we can see
that we can just inductively keep on applying the above argument and form the following pairs
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Men
m1 : w2 ≻ w1 ≻ [· · · ]
m2 : w3 ≻ w1 ≻ w2 ≻ [· · · ]
m3 : w4 ≻ w1 ≻ w3 ≻ [· · · ]
...
mn−y : wn−y+1 ≻ [· · · ]
mn−y+1 : wn−y+2 ≻ w1 ≻ wn−y+1 ≻ [· · · ]
mn−y+2 : wn−y+2 ≻ w1 ≻ w2 ≻ [· · · ]
mn−y+3 : wn−y+2 ≻ w1 ≻ wn−y+3 ≻ [· · · ]
...
mn : wn−y+2 ≻ w1 ≻ wn ≻ [· · · ]
Women
w1 : m1 ≻ · · · ≻ mn−y ≻ (mn−y+1, · · · ,mn)
w2 : m1 ≻ [· · · ]
w3 : m2 ≻ [· · · ]
w4 : m3 ≻ [· · · ]
...
wn−y+1 : mn−y ≻ [· · · ]
wn−y+2 : mn−y+1 ≻ mn−y+2 ≻ [· · · ]
wn−y+3 : mn−y+3 ≻ [· · · ]
wn−y+4 : mn−y+4 ≻ [· · · ]
...
wn : mn ≻ [· · · ]
Figure 2: The instance I that is used in the proof of Theorem 11
ρ = (m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), · · · , (mr, wr) for some r ∈ {2, · · · , n}, wheremi is the last man
on wi’s list and wi+1 is the second woman on mi’s list. However, note that ρ is an exposed
rotation, and hence we have a contradiction.
Before we end this section, we address one final question as to whether, for the class of one-
sided top-truncated preferences, one can obtain a better approximation result if one continues
to consider only weakly-stable matchings. In the theorem below we show that for δ ∈ Ω( 1
n
)
Algorithm 1 is asymptotically the best one can do under this restriction.
Theorem 11. For δ ≤ 12 , if there exists an α-approximation algorithm for δ-min-bp-super-
stable-matching that always returns a matching that is weakly-stable for the case of one-sided
top-truncated preferences, then α ∈ Ω
(
min
{
n
3
2
√
δ, n
})
.
Proof. To prove this, consider the instance I defined as in Figure 2, where y = min
{
⌊2n 32√δ⌋, n
}
.
Below we will show that the statement of the theorem is true when δ ≤ 12n , i.e., show that in
this case α ∈ Ω
(
n
3
2
√
δ
)
. For δ > 12n it is then trivial to extend our instance by just having
some of the other women (other than w1) specify partial preferences.
First, it is easy to verify that this instance has at most δ amount of information missing.
Second, one can see that the optimal solution, i.e., the matching with the minimum number of
super-blocking pairs, for this instance is
Mopt =
{
(m1, w1), (m2, w3), · · · , (mn−y+1, wn−y+2), (mn−y+2, w2),
(mn−y+3, wn−y+3), · · · , (mn, wn)
}
,
where (m1, w2) is the only super-blocking pair.
Given the above observation, let us now consider an arbitrary matching M that is weakly-
stable. Since mi prefers wi+1 the most and vice versa for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n − y + 1}, we know
that M(mi) = wi+1. Hence, M(w1) = mk, for some k ∈ {n − y + 2, · · · , n}. Additionally,
we also know that for all j ∈ {n − y + 2, · · · , n} such that j 6= k, w1 ≻mj M(mj), as none
of these can men can be matched to wn−y+2. This in turn implies that since w1 finds mk
and mj incomparable for j ∈ {n − y + 2 · · · , n} such that j 6= k, (mj, w1) is a super-blocking
pair. Therefore, in any weakly-stable matching M we have (y − 2) ∈ O(n 32√δ) super-blocking
pairs.
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4 Beyond Weak-Stability
In the previous section we investigated weakly-stable matchings and we showed several results
concerning this situation. Here we move away from this restriction and explore what happens
when we do not place any restriction on the matchings. In particular, we begin this section by
showing a general hardness of approximation result, and then follow it with a discussion on one
possible approach that can lead to a near-tight approximation result.
4.1 Inapproximability result for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
We show a hardness of approximation result for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem
through a gap-producing reduction from the Vertex Cover (VC) problem, which is a well-known
NP-complete problem [Kar72]. In the VC problem, we are given a graph G = (V,E), where
V = {v1, · · · , vk}, and a k0 ≤ k and are asked if there exists a subset of the vertices with size
less than or equal to k0 such that it contains at least one endpoint of every edge. When given
an instance I of VC, the key idea in the proof is to create an instance I ′ of δ-min-bp-super-
stable-matching such that if I is a “yes” instance of VC, then I ′ will have a very small number
of super-blocking pairs, and if otherwise, then I ′ will have a large number of super-blocking
pairs.
Theorem 12. For any constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1), one cannot obtain a polynomial-time
(n
√
δ)1−ǫ approximation algorithm for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem unless P =
NP.
Proof. The proof here is similar to the one by Hamada et al. [HIM16, Theorem 1]. The main
difference is in the construction of the instance, which in our case is more involved; once we
have that we can essentially use the same proof as the one by Hamada et al.
Given an instance I = (G = (V,E), k0) of the VC problem, where |V | = k, we construct the
following instance I ′ of the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching problem, where
• d = ⌈8
ǫ
⌉
, y = kd + 1, z = ⌈ 1√
δ
⌉
• MA1 = {m1, · · · ,mk0}, MA2 = {mk0+1, · · · ,mk}, WA = {w1, · · · , wk}
• for every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E and c ∈ {1, · · · , z}, Si,jc = {si,jc,1, · · · si,jc,y}, T i,jc =
{ti,jc,1, · · · ti,jc,y}, P i,jc = {pi,jc,1, · · · pi,jc,y}, and V i,jc = {vi,jc,1, · · · vi,jc,y}
• Si,j = {Si,j1 , · · · Si,jz }, T i,j = {T i,j1 , · · ·T i,jz }, P i,j = {P i,j1 , · · ·P i,jz }, and V i,j = {V i,j1 , · · ·
V i,jz }
• MA =MA1 ∪MA2 , S =
⋃
Si,j, T =
⋃
T i,j, P =
⋃
P i,j, and V =
⋃
V i,j
• U =MA ∪ S ∪ P and W =WA ∪ T ∪ V
• for each i, j the preference orders of the agents are as given in Figure 3. For an agent a,
if RS appears in its preference list for some R and S, then this implies that a finds all
the agents in RS as incomparable. Also, [· · · ] denotes that the rest of the agents can be
placed in any order.
Note that n = |U | = |W | = k + 2yz|E|. Also, the amount of missing information per agent
is at most
(k2)+(
y
2)
(n2)
≤ (
k+y
2 )
(n2)
. Therefore, the total amount of missing information is ≤ (
k+y
2 )
(n2)
≤
(2y2 )
(n2)
≤ 4y2
n2
≤ 4y2
4y2z2
≤ δ. Next, in order to show the correctness, we prove the following claims.
Again, as noted above, the proofs of these use similar ideas as in Hamada et. al’s proof of
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Men
mi : WA ≻ V i,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
s
i,j
1,1 : t
i,j
1,1 ≻ wi ≻ ti,jz
2
+1,1
≻ V i,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
s
i,j
1,2 : t
i,j
1,2 ≻ wi ≻ ti,j1,3 ≻ V i,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
.
..
s
i,j
1,y : t
i,j
1,y ≻ wi ≻ ti,j2,1 ≻ V i,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
s
i,j
2,1 : t
i,j
2,1 ≻ wi ≻ ti,j2,2 ≻ V i,j2 ≻ [· · · ]
.
..
s
i,j
2,y : t
i,j
2,y ≻ wi ≻ ti,j
3,1
≻ V i,j2 ≻ [· · · ]
...
.
..
s
i,j
z
2
,y
: ti,jz
2
,y
≻ wi ≻ ti,j1,1 ≻ V i,jz
2
≻ [· · · ]
s
i,j
z
2
+1,1
: ti,j1,2 ≻ wj ≻ ti,jz
2
+1,2
≻ V i,jz
2
+1
≻ [· · · ]
s
i,j
z
2
+1,2
: ti,jz
2
+1,2
≻ wj ≻ ti,jz
2
+1,3
≻ V i,jz
2
+1
≻ [· · · ]
...
s
i,j
z
2
+1,y
: ti,jz
2
+1,y
≻ wj ≻ ti,jz
2
+2,1
≻ V i,jz
2
+1
≻ [· · · ]
.
..
.
..
s
i,j
z,y−1 : t
i,j
z,y−1 ≻ wj ≻ ti,jz,y ≻ V i,jz ≻ [· · · ]
si,jz,y : t
i,j
z,y ≻ wj ≻ ti,jz
2
+1,1
≻ V i,jz ≻ [· · · ]
p
i,j
1,1 : v
i,j
1,1 ≻ [· · · ]
...
...
pi,jz,y : v
i,j
z,y ≻ [· · · ]
Women
wi : MA1 ≻ S ≻MA2
t
i,j
1,1 : MA ≻ si,jz
2
,y
≻ Si,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
t
i,j
1,2 : MA ≻ si,jz
2
+1,1
≻ Si,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
t
i,j
1,3 : MA ≻ si,j1,2 ≻ Si,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
..
.
t
i,j
1,y : MA ≻ si,j1,y−1 ≻ Si,j1 ≻ [· · · ]
t
i,j
2,1 : MA ≻ si,j1,y ≻ Si,j2 ≻ [· · · ]
.
..
t
i,j
2,y : MA ≻ si,j2,y−1 ≻ Si,j2 ≻ [· · · ]
...
t
i,j
z
2
+1,1
: MA ≻ si,j1,1 ≻ Si,jz
2
+1
≻ [· · · ]
t
i,j
z
2
+1,2
: MA ≻ si,jz
2
+1,1
≻ Si,jz
2
+1
≻ [· · · ]
..
.
...
ti,jz,y : MA ≻ si,jz,y−1 ≻ Si,jz ≻ [· · · ]
v
i,j
1,1 : MA ≻ Si,j1 ≻ pi,j1,1 ≻ [· · · ]
...
v
i,j
1,y : MA ≻ Si,j1 ≻ pi,j1,y ≻ [· · · ]
v
i,j
2,1 : MA ≻ Si,j2 ≻ pi,j2,1 ≻ [· · · ]
...
v
i,j
2,y : MA ≻ Si,j2 ≻ pi,j2,y ≻ [· · · ]
...
.
..
vi,jz,y : MA ≻ Si,jz ≻ pi,jz,y ≻ [· · · ]
Figure 3: The instance I ′ that is used in the proof of Theorem 12
Theorem 1 in [HIM16]. Also, throughout, we make use of the following definition: for every mi,
if mi is not matched to a woman in WA, then we call such a pair as a bad pair. Additionally,
for every si,ja,b, if s
i,j
a,b is matched to a woman who is outside of the top three women in his list
(i.e., for instance, if si,j1,1 is matched with anyone other than t
i,j
1,1, wi, or t
i,j
z
2
+1,1), then we again
call such pairs as being bad.
Claim 5. If a matching M contains a bad pair, then it has at least y − 1 super-blocking pairs.
Proof. Consider the case when mi is matched to a woman w
′ who is not in WA. This implies
that it at least forms a super-blocking pair with all w ∈ V i,j1 such that w 6= w′. And since
every women in V i,j1 finds all the men in MA as incomparable, therefore we at least have
|V i,j1 | − 1 = y − 1 super-blocking pairs.
Next, consider the case when there is a man si,ja,b who is matched to a woman w
′ who is
outside of the top three women in his list. This implies that it at least forms a super-blocking
pair with all w ∈ V i,ja such that w 6= w′. And since we can assume that no women in V i,ja is
matched to a man in MA (as this would anyway result in y − 1 super-blocking pairs as proved
above) and since all of them find the men in Si,ja as incomparable, this implies that we have at
least |V i,ja | − 1 = y − 1 super-blocking pairs.
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Before we go on to the next claim, for every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, consider the sets
Si,j and T i,j and let us the define the following two perfect matchings, Mi,j1 and Mi,j2 , between
Si,j and T i,j. The matching Mi,j1 (Mi,j2 ) can be inferred from Figure 3 by matching every man
in Si,j with the woman coloured red (blue) in his list.
Mi,j1 =
{
(si,j1,1, t
i,j
1,1), (s
i,j
1,2, t
i,j
1,2), · · · , (si,jz
2
,y
, ti,jz
2
,y
), (si,jz
2
+1,1, t
i,j
z
2
+1,2), (s
i,j
z
2
+1,2, t
i,j
z
2
+1,3), · · · , (si,jz,y, ti,jz
2
+1,1)
}
Mi,j2 =
{
(si,j1,1, t
i,j
z
2
+1,1), (s
i,j
1,2, t
i,j
1,3), · · · , (si,jz
2
,y
, ti,j1,1), (s
i,j
z
2
+1,1, t
i,j
1,2), (s
i,j
z
2
+1,2, t
i,j
z
2
+1,2), · · · , (si,jz,y, ti,jz,y)
}
Claim 6. For every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, Mi,j1 and Mi,j2 are the only perfect matchings
between Si,j and T i,j that do not include a bad pair. Moreover, both Mi,j1 and Mi,j2 have only
one super-blocking pair (m,w) such that m ∈ Si,j and w ∈ T i,j.
Proof (sketch). It is easy to observe the first part. As for the second part, note that none of
si,j1,1, · · · , si,jz
2
,y
form any super-blocking pair inM1 as they are matched to their topmost choices.
Also, none of si,jz
2
+1,2, · · · , si,jz,y form any super-blocking pairs since the only woman they can form
super-blocking pairs with, which are ti,jz
2
+1,2, · · · ti,jz,y respectively, strictly prefers their currently
matched partner, which are si,jz
2
+1,2, · · · , si,jz,y respectively. Hence, the only super-blocking pair
is (si,jz
2
+1,1, t
i,j
1,2). We can make similar arguments with respect to M2 to show that (si,j1,1, ti,j1,1) is
the only super-blocking pair.
Given the two claims above, we can now prove the correctness of the reduction through the
following lemmas.
Lemma 13. If I = (G, k0) is a “yes” instance of VC, then I ′ has a solution with at most 2k2
super-blocking pairs.
Proof. Let the vertex cover of G be C and since it is a “yes” instance, we know that |C| ≤ k0.
If the size of C is strictly less than k0, then add arbitrary vertices to it in order to make its size
k0. So from now on we can assume that |C| = k0. Next, construct the following matching M
for the instance I ′.
• For every woman wi ∈ WA, if vi ∈ C, then match wi with some man in MA1 . Otherwise,
match wi with some man in MA2 .
• For every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, if vi ∈ C, then match every man in Si,j with a
woman in T i,j using Mi,j2 as defined above. Otherwise, match every man in Si,j with a
woman in T i,j using Mi,j1 as defined above.
• For every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, match pi,ja,b with vi,ja,b.
Now, we know that the each man in MA can form at most k super-blocking pairs (one with
each woman in WA). Additionally, we know from Claim 6 that both Mi,j1 and Mi,j2 have at
most one super-blocking pair, and that none of the men in P form any super-blocking pair
as they all get their topmost choice. Hence, the total number of blocking pairs is at most
k2 + |E| ≤ 2k2.
Lemma 14. If I = (G, k0) is a “no” instance of VC, then every matching for I ′ has at least
y − 1 super-blocking pairs.
Proof. Here we will show that if there exists a matching M with less than y− 1 super-blocking
pairs for I ′, then I has a vertex cover of size at most k0. To see this, consider M. Since it has
less than y − 1 blocking pairs, we know from Claim 5 that it does not have any bad pair. This
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in turn implies that all the men in MA are matched with a woman in WA (since all men in MA
have to be attached to a woman in WA and size of both the sets are equal).
Next, for every i < j such that (vi, vj) ∈ E, let us consider the men and women in Si,j
and T i,j. Since, again, we cannot have any bad pairs, we know that there has to be a perfect
matching between these two sets. Additionally, from Claim 6 we know that Mi,j1 and Mi,j2 are
the only two perfect matchings that have no bad pairs. Now, for an (i, j), if we were using
Mi,j1 , then it is easy to see that wj should be matched with a man in MA1 as otherwise she
would form a super-blocking pair with all the men in {si,jz
2
,1, · · · , si,jz,y}, thus resulting in at least
zy > y − 1 super-blocking pairs for M. Similarly, if we were using Mi,j2 , then wi should be
matched with a man in MA1 as otherwise we would have at least zy > y − 1 blocking pairs.
Therefore, we have that for each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E at least one of the women wi or wj should
be matched to a man in MA1 . So, now, if we define C = {vi | M(wi) ∈ MA1}, then we have a
vertex cover of size at most k0 (as size of MA1 is k0).
Finally, from Lemmas 13 and 14, we have an inapproximability gap of α, where
α ≥ y − 1
2k2
=
kd
2k2
>
n
√
δ
16k4
(using the fact that n = 2yzk2 + k ≤ 8kd+2 1√
δ
)
>
(
n
√
δ
)1−ǫ
(using the fact that n = 2yzk2 + k > 2yz > 2kd 1√
δ
)
4.2 A possible general approach for obtaining a near-tight approximation
factor for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
While obtaining a general near-tight approximation result for the δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching
problem is still open, in this section we propose a potentially promising direction for this prob-
lem. In particular, we demonstrate how solving even a very relaxed version of the min-delete-
stable-matching problem will be enough to get an O(n)-approximation for δ-min-bp-super-
stable-matching in general. Below, we first define the relaxation in question, which we refer to
as an (α, β)-approximation to the min-delete-super-stable-matching problem.
Definition 5 ((α, β)-min-delete-super-stable-matching). Given an instance I = (δ, pU , pW ),
compute a set D′ such that |D′| ≤ α · |Dopt|, where |Dopt| is the size of the optimal solu-
tion to the min-delete-super-stable-matching for the same instance, and the instance I−D′ =
(δ−D′ , pU\D′ , pW\D′), where δ−D′ = 1|(U∪W )\D′|
∑
i∈(U∪W )\D′ δi, has a matching with at most β
super-blocking pairs.
Next, we show that an (α, β)-approximation to the min-delete-super-stable-matching prob-
lem gives us an (αn+ β)-approximation for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching. So, in particular,
if we have an (α, β)-approximation where α is a constant and β ∈ O(n), then this in turn gives
us an O(n)-approximation for δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching in general.
Proposition 15. If there exists an (α, β)-approximation algorithm for the min-delete-super-
stable-matching problem, then there exists an (αn+ β)-approximation algorithm for the δ-min-
bp-super-stable-matching problem.
Proof (sketch). We can proceed to prove this almost exactly as in the proof of Theorem 10.
Here, if D denotes the (α, β)-approximate solution returned by the algorithm, then the only
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difference is that we define M1 to be the matching with the set of agents in (U ∪W ) \D such
that it has at most β super-blocking pairs (from the definition of the problem we know that
such a matching exists) andM2 to be an arbitrary matching on the set of agents in D. Once we
have this, then we can arrive at the bound by proceeding exactly as in the proof of Theorem 10,
with the only difference being that here we would use S1, which is the number of super-blocking
pairs associated with M1, to be equal to
(
n− |D|2
)
· |D|2 + β.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we initiated a study on matching with partial information in order to investigate
what makes a matching “good” in this context, and to better understand the trade-off between
the amount of missing information and the quality of different matchings. Towards this end,
we introduced a measure for accounting for missing preference information in an instance, and
argued that a natural definition of a “good” matching in this context is one that minimizes the
maximum number of blocking pairs with respect to all the possible completions. Subsequently,
using an equivalent problem (δ-min-bp-super-stable-matching) we first explored the space of
matchings that contained no obvious blocking pairs (i.e., weakly-stable matchings) in order to
better understand how missing preference information effected/affected the quality, in terms of
approximation with respect to the objective of minimizing the number of super-blocking pairs.
Later on, by expanding the space of matchings we considered (i.e., removing the restriction
that matches must be weakly-stable), we asked whether it was possible to improve on the
approximation factors that were achieved under the restriction to weakly-stable matchings.
There are a number of interesting directions for future work. First, while in Section 4.2
we proposed one possible approach that can lead to near-tight approximations, there may be
other approaches that can prove fruitful. Second, we believe that the min-delete-super-stable-
matching problem, and its relaxation we introduced, are both of independent interest, and so an
open question is to see if one can obtain general results on them. In Proposition 6 we saw that
a 2-approximation was achievable for the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences and hence
it would also be interesting to determine if there are other interesting classes of preferences for
which constant-factor approximations are possible. Finally, there are possible extensions, like,
for instance, allowing incompleteness—meaning the agents can specify that they are willing to
be matched to only a subset of the agents on the other set—that one could consider and ask
similar questions like the ones we considered.
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Men
m1 : w1 ≻ WF\{1} ≻ WB1 ≻ · · · ≻ WBz
m2 : w1 ≻ w2 ≻ [· · · ]
m3 : w2 ≻ w3 ≻ WF\{2,3} ≻ WS
m4 : w2 ≻ w4 ≻ WF\{2,4} ≻ WS
..
.
mn
2
: w2 ≻ wn
2
≻ WF\{2,n
2
} ≻ WS
mb0 : w1 ≻ WB1\{b0} ≻ wb0 ≻ WS\B1 ≻WF\{1}
...
mb1−1 : w1 ≻ WB1\{b1−1} ≻ wb1−1 ≻WS\B1 ≻WF\{1}
mb1 : w1 ≻ WB2\{b1} ≻ wb1 ≻ WS\B2 ≻WF\{1}
.
..
mb2−1 : w1 ≻ WB2\{b2−1} ≻ wb2−1 ≻WS\B2 ≻WF\{1}
...
mbz−1 : w1 ≻ WBz\{bz−1} ≻ wbz−1 ≻ WS\Bz ≻WF\{1}
..
.
mbz−1 : w1 ≻ WBz\{bz−1} ≻ wbz−1 ≻WS\Bz ≻ WF\{1}
Women
w1 : m2 ≻ m1 ≻ [· · · ]
w2 : m2 ≻ m1 ≻ [· · · ]
w3 : m1 ≻ m3 ≻ [· · · ]
w4 : m1 ≻ m4 ≻ [· · · ]
.
..
wn
2
: m1 ≻ mn
2
≻ [· · · ]
wb0 : MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb0 ≻MF\{1} ≻MTB1\{b0}
...
wb1−1 : MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb1−1 ≻MF\{1} ≻MTB1\{b1−1}
wb1 : MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb1 ≻MF\{1} ≻MTB1\{b1}
...
wb2−1 : MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mb2−1 ≻MF\{1} ≻MTB1\{b2−1}
..
.
wbz−1 : MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mbz−1 ≻MF\{1} ≻MTB1\{bz−1}
...
wbz−1 : MS\B1 ≻ m1 ≻ mbz−1 ≻MF\{1} ≻MTB1\{bz−1}
Figure 4: The instance I that is used to illustrate that there can be weakly-stable matchings with
O(n2
√
δ) super-blocking pairs even in the case of one-sided top-truncated preferences
A Example to illustrate “bad” weakly-stable matchings in the
case of one-sided top-truncated preferences
Consider the instance I as shown in Figure 4, where ties appear only on the women’s side.
Furthermore, we define the following:
• δ ∈ [ 16
n2
, 14 ], y =
n
√
δ
2 , z =
n
2y (for simplicity we assume that y and z are integers; we can
appropriately modify the proof if that is not the case)
• bj = n2 + jy + 1,∀j ∈ [0, · · · z]
• Bi = {bi−1, · · · , bi − 1},∀i ∈ [1, · · · z], F = {1, · · · , n2 }, S = {n2 + 1, · · · , n}
• WX (MX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X in the increasing
order of their indices
• W TX (MTX) : for some set X, place all the women (men) with index in X as tied
• [· · · ] : place all the remaining alternatives in some strict order.
First thing is to see that the optimal solution Mopt associated with the instance is
Mopt = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), · · · , (mn, wn)} ,
where (m2, w1) is the only super-blocking pair (and it is an obvious blocking pair). Also, it can
be verified that the total amount of missing information in I is at most δ.
Now, consider the matching M, where
M =
{
(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w4) · · · , (mn
2
, wn
2
),
(mb0 , wb0+1), (mb0+1, wb0+2), · · · , (mb1−2, wb1−1), (mb1−1, wb0),
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(mb1 , wb1+1), (mb1+1, wb1+2), · · · , (mb2−2, wb2−1), (mb2−1, wb1), · · · ,
· · · , (mbz−1 , wbz−1+1), (mbz−1+1, wbz−1+2), · · · , (mbz−2, wbz−1), (mbz−1, wbz−1)
}
.
It is easy to check that M is weakly-stable. Also, it can be verified that it has O(n2
√
δ) super-
blocking pairs (this is because with respect to each block Bj one can see that M has O
(|Bj|2)
super-blocking pairs).
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